This government’s difference rests on the dispute for a new model for the Amazon region, states secretary. [06/11/2006 15:05]
The Special Feature’s first interview about deforestation – the second in the series – is with Mr. João Paulo Capobianco, Secretary of Forests and Biodiversity of the Ministry of the Environment. In it, he recognises the difficulties involved in the establishment of an economic incentive policy for the maintenance of the standing forest, and labels as a “false piece of statistics” the annual deforestation average during Lula’s administration, which is higher than the previous president’s, Fernando Henrique. For Capobianco, the great differential of Minister Marina Silva’s mandate at the Ministry of the Environment is an effective dispute for a new development model for the Amazon region.
The expressions “structuring action” and “transversality” are among the most repeated by representatives of the federal administration environmental area. They seek to point out what is considered by the Ministry of the Environment as the great innovation in public policy carried out by Minister Marina Silva, specially the Action Plan for Deforestation Prevention and Control in the Amazon Region. The first expression describes initiatives that would be carried out in order to change the economy’s fundaments and the occupation patterns in the Amazon region, so as to implement a sustainable development model for that region, thus maintaining permanent decreases in deforestation rates. The second expression names the new articulation between the several ministries in order to tackle the country’s environmental problems.
In the following interview granted to ISA, the Secretary of Forests and Biodiversity of the Ministry of the Environment, João Paulo Capobianco, sketches a balance of the so-called “structuring actions” and of “transversality” put into practice by the Ministry. He recognised, for instance, the difficulties faced within the government to establish an economic incentive policy in defence of the forest and labels as “a false piece of statistics” the annual deforestation average during president Lula’s administration, which is higher than in the previous mandate, that of president Fernando Henrique. According to the biologist and Ph.D. in Agriculture and Environment at UNICAMP (Campinas State University), the great differential of Minister Marina Silva’s administration is the effective dispute for a new development model for the Amazon region. Capobianco is one of the authors of the plan against deforestation and one of the technicians closest to the Minister. He was one of the founders of the SOS Atlantic Rainforest Foundation, of the Atlantic Rainforest NGO Network, and of ISA.
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| Capobianco: The decentralisation of forest management does not mean that the federal government is not responsible for deforestation in the Amazon region. |
ISA – What are the chief merits and main gaps in the policy against deforestation in the Amazon region under President Lula’s administration?
João Paulo Capobianco – The chief merit is the attempt and the perspective that we are creating as we adopt measures that may definitively reverse deforestation in the medium and long terms. In other words, reduction guarantees in the short term, but not episodic reductions, and, in addition, guarantees that would consolidate a new development model for the Amazon region. I would say that there are actions that do not constitute gaps, but instead they are actions that do not mature in just one, two or three years. For instance, the setting up of a Public Forest Management Law. This is a concrete action. It was extremely important to obtain a law and secure the necessary conditions. Now, we have to implement it.
It is in the structuring phase, which, within the government, involves a complex process. To implement a public forest management operational system, to implement the Brazilian Forest Service (Serviço Florestal Brasileiro - SFB), to regulate legislation in the sense that it becomes effective, to build partnerships and the interest coalitions that may concretely render this system viable - this is what we are doing now and we have little time to do it. Because what will be at play in the next government regarding forest management, in my opinion, is not whether it is good or bad, but whether or not this will find continuity. The feature is whether in fact there is trustworthiness, whether we can develop such an agenda at all, which is complex and controversial for some sectors. We are placing our bets on a positive outcome, where it is possible to create new conditions, to implement the Brazilian Forest Service, the public forests registry, to start off the processes so that we can have a few bid invitations in course, providing the next government with tranquillity, the safety in knowing it can charge ahead and even accelerate the process. Thus, this is the difficulty. It is a difficulty inherent to the Brazilian public system.
Before the end of this year. The law allows us, along the BR-163 highway (Cuiabá-Santarém), to start off straight away. We are investing heavily in the National Forest management plans along the highway so as to imprint a short term perspective. We are also working to set up and run the Public Forest National Registry, which plays a central role in the forest management system. We are also advancing in the partnerships with other states, such as the agenda with the states of Pará and Mato Grosso. Pará features a good perspective of presently creating its own agency [of forest management] and its state forests. So does Mato Grosso.
We hold the concrete perspective of some states taking up the political commitment to collaborate in the reversal of the deforestation process and simultaneously collaborate in the implementation of valuing processes for the standing forest. In my evaluation, the states of Acre, Amapá, Mato Grosso and Pará are moving along this direction, with different attitudes. These four states feature such an agenda.
What the Management Law has definitely put forward is that which was already correct: IBAMA’s role has to be maintained and strengthened within a regional scope, in the feature of general norms and general regulations, as well as providing support to the implementation of such agenda. Along the years, IBAMA was dragged towards a “retail” agenda, in other words, licensing. This would be, theoretically, a role for the Federation states to play, but which they did not wish to take up or have refused to do so. The Management Law defines this clearly and definitively for the states that had been postponing this activity, be it because it is more convenient to leave it in the hands of the IBAMA, be it because they supported an opposite policy.
The law defines that the states have to take up the lead in the scope of their territories with regards to conservation. The law does not state decentralisation nor do-as-you-will. The law states that decentralisation is intended for the responsible management and conservation of the public forest. This is an agenda that did not interest the states. On the contrary, many states fomented the conversion of forests while IBAMA tried to protect them. Now everything is explicit. The Federal government can play a role on two fronts: keeping its complementary power, and of also being responsible. We cannot repeat what took place in Mato Grosso, when, once the SLAPR [Rural Property Environmental Licensing System - Sistema de Licenciamento Ambiental das Propriedades Rurais] was set up, the federal government presumed it was a matter for the state to handle. This is not a state level problem; it is a problem for the IBAMA and the federal government to solve. You have a role of supporting and following up these initiatives, but at the same time of acting effectively. In the case of the omission of a state, the federal government has to step in and act.
An articulated process has to be undertaken. First, we will continue to monitor, on a regional and state level, as it is done today. The DETER [Amazon Region Deforestation Detection in Real Time System - Sistema de Detecção em Tempo Real do Desmatamento na Amazônia] will continue existing, be improved and indeed will become a support tool for the states. The responsibility over deforestation in the Amazon region continues to fall on the federal government’s shoulders. The law says that the management of and the responsibility for deforestation applies to all spheres. What is taking place now is a co-responsibility agenda regarding the states and not the opposite. This is not the case of the federal government avoiding responsibility. This is the only way of operating a responsible and effective management.
In its original conception, the plan is grounded on the fact that the deforestation reversal in the Amazon region involves several fronts. One of its pillars is the productivity increase in already converted areas. More than that: the reincorporation into productive activity of the abandoned or underused land. Now, this action does not depend just on the will of a single ministry, the Ministry of Agriculture. It depends on a set of actions involving rules for public and private credit. Considering that in the Amazon region, for instance, over 70% of credit is private, we have to work with making technology available, with investments. The big problem in such converted and underused land results from production difficulties, for they are poorly used areas, featuring poor or sandy soil, land that has lost its productive capacity. This involves investments. We have to have a policy for soil and micro-watersheds recovery.
We have formally presented a proposal for the inclusion of environmental conditions in the debt renegotiation contracts. That is, the producer adopting some commitments regarding the environmental agenda, restoration of APPs [Permanent Protected Areas – Áreas de Proteção Ambiental], degraded areas, legal reservations etc. Including commitments toward the reduction of deforestation as a condition for the maintenance of these contracts’ deadline extensions. Now, this subject would merit a very careful and detailed analysis, because the features of debit and credit of these agriculturers is very complex. In fact, we are dealing with a situation in which any conditioning or additional element that you may place in the renegotiation as a condition becomes unworkable or just words on a page. This was a process about which I am not able to tell what would have happened if this or that had been done and, if it did, what result it would have yielded. I am sure there has been an effort by the government involving the ministries of Agrarian Development, Agriculture and the Environment, so that the negotiations resulted in important environmental gains. I have participated in more than one high level meeting seeking such understanding and it was very difficult to operate. We were discussing how could we create an incentive in which the agriculturist would not only be called up to bear his responsibility, as the law requires, but also offer some additional credit element that would stimulate him to do so. We face difficulties, of exponential growth, in proposing an activity in which the individual takes credit and has to pay back, but at the same time leads him to develop an activity without economic returns in the final calculation of his debt or of his capacity to pay. This kind of commitment can lead the agriculturist to be unable to honour the debt, within a scenario in which he has sought renegotiation because he could not make it. This is an feature that needs to be worked on a lot and I think it is not mature yet.
This is the difficulty. There is an understanding within the government, involving the Ministry of Agriculture and credit organisations, that we must advance this agenda, and increasingly place this element into the context of the Crop Plan, into debt renegotiations. Because some people think it is a lack of will, that there is no interest in discussing the agenda, that this agenda is secondary for the government as a whole and for the Ministry of Agriculture. It is not true. In several occasions, we have worked towards placing these elements into the negotiations and into the Crop Plan. We have been hindered by objective difficulties. For instance, credit is characterised today by a low interest rate that the government establishes as a differential for agriculturist activity under certain conditions. Now, this lower rate is paid. The government pays in order to cease to receive. So, this element enters a macroeconomic analysis that is not so simple. All the elements that may stimulate the responsible use of private property, from the environmental point of view, are being worked on. The Crop Plan has even included several small adjustments in the past and present years. Now, those who deal with the recuperation of degraded areas demand investment. The owner has to invest, he has to plant, mobilise labour. Perhaps we have to create a programme in which the government has to invest on a much higher level than it does today.
Many proposals were put forward. There are many proposals now under way, which have been the object of much discussion within the government. We have not been able to obtain a result for this yet. One of the high points of this new agriculture strategy is the crop/cattle raising integration programme. I understand that this programme can bring extremely important benefits along the lines of value addition, of production increase and reduction in the pressure on the agriculture frontier expansion, not only in the Amazon region, but also in the savannah (cerrado) and in all biomes. The government is committed as a whole, as is the Ministry of Agriculture, not to stimulate the conversion of the Amazon rainforest.
How to transform this into reality? First, by doing that which is not the competence of the Agriculture sector: allot public land, reduce the option of converting the forest. This is being done now. On the other hand, there isn’t credit available. Today, the Amazon Bank (Basa) and the constitutional funds are closed to the agriculture and cattle raising activities that cause deforestation. This took place now, in the last two, three years and is already consolidating within the government. Some have taken the radical line and not only do not finance projects depending on deforestation, but also do not finance cattle raising in the Amazon region at all. What is lacking is the sketching of a programme that is viable in terms of funding and incentive to a better use of these already converted areas. In order to do so, this agriculture programme is extremely important because it is based on this perspective: how do I make better use of the 600 thousand square kilometres that are already opened in the Amazon region and how do I reincorporate the production of 160 thousand square kilometres of underused land?
For me, this is secondary... The difference is that I strive to see in this curve a sustainable and permanent reduction. This feature of adding up the average of this administration and compare it with past administrations’ is a piece of false statistics. The proper statistics would involve the comparison between economic opportunities, population presence in the region. I do not make calculations simply looking at one calculus element. I make calculations looking at the bigger scenario. Which government has decreased deforestation rates in a period of national economy acceleration? None. You could even argue that the problem is at the level of conjuncture that although there has been growth in the national economy, in a certain region there was a crisis regarding commodities. And I would answer that the crisis was more significant regarding the soy bean crops and not cattle-raising… but that it has too taken place in cattle-raising. So, one gets involved in a war of interpretations that leads nowhere because we are not competing to know who has deforested more or less. We are competing for a new development model for the Amazon region.
ISA, Oswaldo Braga and André Lima.


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